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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Time-tested methods 
We have been told often, throughout the last decade, that the tools of 
Sovietology are no longer applicable in today's vibrant Russian state. The 
leaders of today, while perhaps not fully committed to democratic transparency, 
are nonetheless, more willing and better equipped to face both domestic and 
international scrutiny. Even when a shadowy silovek emerged as Yel'tsin's 
political heir, even after suspicious apartment bombings in Moscow re-sparked 
the Chechen war and catapulted the grey colonel to the Presidency, still Russia's 
path to democracy, while perhaps considered arduous, was accepted as 
somehow irreversible. 
 
War against Chechnya, the subjugation of the media, (Has anyone forgotten the 
note Gusinsky was forced to sign by Press Minister Lesin? Sign over Media-
MOST or go to jail.) Economic, legal and Kompromat attacks on (admittedly 
bloated) oligarchic entrepreneurs, the quiet once again present in Russian 
kitchens, where political conversations have been banished. The list is too long 
to review in full; a new entrant however, makes interesting fodder for the Kremlin-
watching klatches. 
 
Novaya gazeta (NG, 02 Oct 02 via eastview.com) presents excerpts of a press 
conference with President Putin that were published in various western media, 
but not made available for Russian domestic consumption. 
 
On Chechnya: 
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Peter Baker of the Washington Post quotes deputy assistant U.S. Secretary of 
State Steven Pfeiffer [as trans.] as declaring that "Moscow's black and white 
vision of the Chechen conflict…exercises a bad influence on the Russian-
American relations in general." 
 
Putin replies: "I would not like to comment on the statements of the "small" 
bureaucrat. 
 
But we have a saying in Russia: "In every family, there will be someone ugly." 
So, if anyone wants to cast a shadow on the Russian-American relations, it is not 
hard to do." 
 
"We have an understanding for your "fellows," who are carrying out their uneasy 
mission in Iraq…Are you sure that everything is fine there on the human rights 
front? Or is it worth digging into and [trying to] improve our interstate relations? 
Should I remind you about the tragic events which are taking place there? How 
are we supposed to define the status of those, who are being held in 
Guantanamo bay, at the Cuban base? Who are they? Are they protected by the 
humanitarian or international law?" 
 
Baker later inquires about the hostage crisis in the Dubrovka theater, asking 
Putin if he had any regrets, given the number of casualties. 
 
Putin responds "These people did not die as a result of us using the gas, 
because the gas [itself] was not harmful. [These] people became victims of 
several other circumstances… 
 
Not a single security service in the world has [ever] conducted a similar operation 
in analogous conditions…And, when everything is behind us, we can say that not 
a single hostage suffered during the operation. Many died not because of the gas 
[poisoning], but because doctors did not know how to treat [these] people, and let 
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us say, a person who should have been placed on his belly, was placed on his 
back: his tongue would stick [inside] and people would get suffocated." Do you 
suppose the officials in charge of the operation could have informed the doctors 
of what chemicals were to be used and how to treat those affected? It seems 
certain many Russian citizens would be asking the same questions, given the 
opportunity! 
 
From the same incident, we have a Putinism on freedom of the press: "You 
mentioned the law, which limits the mass media [in reporting] elections-related 
events (…) NTV filming served as an excuse for it. The events right before the 
storming (of the theatre on Dubrovka) were filmed. A TV correspondent bribed a 
policeman, sneaked on to the roof and was filming from the roof. Right before the 
beginning of the storming, the correspondent mentioned some movement, which 
looked like a coming storm [of the theatre]. What was this done for? For the sake 
of the freedom of expression? No, it was done because they wanted to get ahead 
of their competitors, who did not bribe the policemen." 
 
Lest foreign investors or domestic upstarts forget the pressures placed on Yukos, 
which Henry Kissinger temporarily seemed to lift from the oil giant's shoulders, 
the campaign is mounting again. Putin's remarks make clear his commitment to 
democracy and transparency. 
 
Noting that the arrest of Yukos' Platon Lebedev may have caused some minor 
damage to the Russian market, Putin emphasizes that Lebedev is not a political 
figure. He is then asked why Lebedev was held in jail for three and a half months 
"for allegedly economic-related crimes," leading some to believe he was a 
political prisoner. 
 
Putin: "Should we say then, that all people who spent three months in prison are 
political prisoners? What about those who spent there two or four months - are 
they not political figures anymore?" Huh? 
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"I talked to the Prosecutor General on this issue. I asked him: "Why was it not 
simply enough to interrogate him?" He said: "Mr. President, we are ready to use 
this method. But Mr. Lebedev was hiding from us. We found him in an average 
military hospital in Moscow region. There are many high-class clinics in Moscow, 
where people can be treated if they want to. Why was he there? Because he was 
hiding from us." 
 
This sounds like a bad "New Russian" joke with a security service twist. 
Unfortunately for Lebedev, neither the question of actual legality nor of criminality 
received a serous answer. 
 
Now why do you suppose this information was not transmitted to a domestic 
audience? Different reasons in each case, I suppose. At least Novaya gazeta 
decided to buck the trends and attempt to bring light to the shadows. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
New cooperation between FSB and Afghan security organizations? 
Early in October, FSB Deputy Director Viktor Kolmogorov traveled to 
Afghanistan, where he met with Afghan Defense Minister Mohammad Fahim, 
Minister of Border and Tribal Affairs Aref Noorzai, and National Security Adviser 
Yunis Qanuni. (RBC NEWS, 8 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Although Russia does not share a border with Afghanistan, the Kremlin 
apparently views the country as a major security concern, since one of the major 
drug-trafficking routes into Russia runs through Tajikistan, which does border 
Afghanistan. In any case, the drug trade was a topic of discussion at the meeting. 
The FSB’s press release on the visit stated that Afghan and Russian Security 
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Services had "realized the need for joint work on specific cases and facts 
connected with the activity on Afghan territory of international terrorist groups," 
apparently referring to possible impact on Chechnya (BBC MONITORING, 8 Oct 
03; ITAR-TASS via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The result of the meeting was that the FSB provided equipment to the Afghan 
security services. The FSB press release added that "the Afghan experts will be 
given assistance in handling the equipment." (ITAR-TASS, 8 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-
2003-1008 via World News Connection) 
 
This can only mean that the FSB intends to have operatives of its own working 
with, training, and possibly controlling indigenous Afghan security forces: 
something that should be a deep cause of concern for the United States and its 
allies, as they try to control over warring elements in the country. Based on the 
FSB’s closeness to the Russian President, one cannot discount the possibility 
that the FSB is being used as a conduit of sorts, in an attempt to regain a 
foothold in Afghanistan, to increase the opportunities for Russia to assert control 
in areas of Central Asia and other parts of the Near and Middle East. 
 
Are GRU & SVR running illegal operations in Germany? 
In the run up to the summit between President Putin and Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder, various media sources in Germany ran stories about Russian 
intelligence activities in Germany. Their sources apparently were high-level 
contacts in the German Counter-Intelligence Services. (WHAT THE PAPERS 
SAY, 9 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Apparently, the BundesKriminallAmt (BKA)–Germany’s equivalent to the FBI is 
not so much concerned with covert SVR or GRU officers, as with the large 
number of incoming immigrants. Since the end of the Cold War, large numbers of 
individuals have made use of Germany’s citizenship laws, which allow anyone 
with German ancestry to claim residence and a passport. It is from within this 
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group, that Russian intelligence services are alleged to have recruited a large 
number of agents. (WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, 9 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) This is a growing concern for the German government, since 
many of the immigrants are skilled workers finding employment in Germany's 
high-tech sector, a priority target of industrial espionage. 
 
It seems likely that, given the atmosphere of increased friendship and 
cooperation between Germany and Russia, Schroeder chose to leak the 
intelligence services' claims through the media as a subtle way of sending a 
message to the Russian President, namely that "true friendship in trade and 
politics is incompatible with continuing to steal German secrets." (WHAT THE 
PAPERS SAY, 9 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Normally such a 
leak would be regarded as an embarrassment to a visiting head of state, but 
Schroeder may have found this avenue preferable to putting a direct question to 
Putin. Given the current atmosphere of geniality, the anonymous leaks allow 
Schroeder to confront the issue more directly with Putin should the situation not 
"resolve itself." 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Dullea 
 
Putin and Schroeder in Yekaterinburg 
On 8 and 9 October Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroeder and his diplomatic and political entourage in the Ural 
mountain city of Yekaterinburg. The talks, which covered issues of non-
proliferation, terrorism, international and regional conflicts, trade, energy, 
transportation and other issues, resulted in the signing of several agreements, 
prospects for future agreements, and business deals worth over a billion euros. 
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Some of the agreements achieved at this sixth meeting of Putin and Schroeder 
just this year included: 
 
- an agreement on the transfer of German munitions and military personnel 
through Russian territory destined for Germany’s military operations in 
Afghanistan; 
- simplification of travel procedures for Russian and German citizens; 
- agreements on the elimination of Russian decommissioned nuclear 
submarines; on teaching the Russian language in Germany and the German 
language in Russia and on youth exchanges; on the continuation of a program to 
upgrade the skills of Russian economic managers; 
- a memorandum of understanding between Russian Railways Open Joint Stock 
Company and Deutsche Bahn railways for cooperation in passenger and freight 
operations; 
- and a business deal for the German company E.ON to construct an electric 
plant in Russia worth five million euros, a deal worth 700 million euros for the 
German firm Wintershall to develop natural gas fields in Russia, and an 
additional gas pipeline deal worth 5 billion euros with Ruhrgas and Wintershall to 
be signed in the near future. 
 
Although other topics such as Iraq were discussed, it was the economic arena 
that dominated the agenda. (ITAR-TASS, 9 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1009 via 
World News Connection) Not surprisingly the German media declared energy the 
most important subject of the summit (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEIN, 8 Oct 03, 
#233) as Germany is no doubt pleased to join with Russia as energy business 
partners. The two leaders at the summit extolled the solid economic relationship 
that exists between the two countries: Germany is Russia’s leading foreign 
investor and according to Putin "will remain the main foreign trading partner of 
Russia outside the Commonwealth of Independent States," (ITAR-TASS, 9 Oct 
03, Ibid.) and, according to Schroeder, Russia is the most important supplier of 
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energy resources to Germany. (ITAR-TASS, 7 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1007 via 
World News Connection) 
 
Despite the euphoria among German businessmen, it was the reaction of other 
parties that probably was more important to Putin, who emphasized that the 
nuclear submarine recycling agreement was living up to the standards set by the 
G-8 on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (ITAR-TASS, 9 Oct 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-1009 via World News Connection) Moreover, the military transit 
agreement is Russia’s first such agreement with a NATO member. (WWW.DW-
WORLD.DE, 9 Oct 03) 
 
The Russian president also took the opportunity to admonish the European 
Union (E.U.) for attempting allegedly to twist Russia’s arm by threatening 
Russian accession to the World Trade Organization if Moscow did not raise its 
domestic energy prices. He called on German business leaders, in their own 
interest, to exercise influence on E.U. bureaucrats. Putin also noted that Russia 
may begin to pay debts owed to the Paris Club ahead of schedule, and that 
Moscow might start to list its energy prices in euros - a major boost for the 
European currency. The latter move, experts in a Moscow Times interview (10 
Oct 03 via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) #7361, 10 Oct 03) agreed, is a political 
bargaining chip to win concessions in Russia’s bid for a visa-free regime with 
Europe and accession to the E.U. 
 
While the E.U., the G-8, NATO and the Paris Club may have been tantalized by 
such signals from Yekaterinburg, one topic they did not hear mentioned was 
Chechnya or the human rights situation in the Russian Federation. Schroeder 
and Putin traded compliments about their countries' interdependence, lasting 
relations, openness and political harmony. That the potential for massive profits 
was enough to distract the Germans from the unpleasant subject of the recent, 
dubious "elections" in Chechnya, demonstrates the advantageous position in 
which Russia now finds itself as energy-hungry nations of the developed world 
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try to feed themselves in hard economic times. Moscow finds itself in a position 
to make political and economic deals without fear of being called to task on its 
questionable activities in the areas of human rights and open society. 
 
Foreign Minister in Switzerland 
Although German officials may have been keen to avoid the Chechnya issue, 
their Swiss colleagues, with less at stake in their relationship to Moscow, insisted 
on a Russian explanation of the recent "elections" there. On an official visit to 
Bern on 13-14 October, Russian Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov met with his Swiss 
counterpart Federal Councilor for Foreign Affairs Michelin Calmy-Rey for annual 
bilateral talks between the two countries. Ivanov also met with Swiss Federal 
President Pascal Couchepin and Federal Councilor for Economic Affairs Joseph 
Deiss. 
 
Ivanov, answering questions from the media in Bern, linked the issue of 
modifications to the current Swiss-Russian visa regime to the developments in 
Russian-E.U. visa negotiations — perhaps as a plea to the Swiss officials to 
exert whatever influence they can on their E.U. neighbors. Ivanov was no doubt 
aware that a Swiss-German summit would follow on the heels of the Russian-
Swiss meeting. 
 
Responding to the Swiss officials’ inquiries about the recent elections in 
Chechnya, Ivanov took the opportunity to express his disappointment that the 
E.U., the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council 
of Europe decided not to play a role in observing the recent elections there and 
asked the Swiss people to observe the situation in the Chechen Republic 
"objectively." 
 
Following the visit, the Russian Foreign Ministry pointed to the similar stances of 
Bern and Moscow on the issues of reconstruction in Iraq and the role of the 
United Nations regarding Afghanistan and the Middle East. Other more tangible 
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results of the talks included Switzerland’s decision to finance programs aimed at 
destroying Russia's remaining chemical weapons stockpiles, amounting to a 
pledge of 15 million Swiss francs, according to the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs official website. 
 
Additionally, the Russian Foreign Ministry was eager to publish its success in 
persuading Switzerland to begin paying settlements to the families of the victims 
of the July 2002 Tupelev (TU)-154 commercial airliner crash over Germany’s 
Lake Constance region, a crash determined to be the fault of the Swiss air 
control system. Although the starting date for payments remains unclear, it 
appears the Russian government is satisfied with their inevitability, even as the 
crash investigation continues. (ITAR-TASS, 13 Oct 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Russia’s relationship with Switzerland, though economically not unimportant, is 
not dependent on the energy market, which has become the lifeblood of Russia’s 
recent economic upswing. Thus, while the Swiss were able to put tough 
questions to Ivanov on Checnya, Moscow was also able to use the visit to 
Switzerland as an outlet to parade its version of the Chechnya election saga, 
without imperiling any potentially valuable energy profits. 
 
Putin and Bush at APEC 
President Putin and U.S. President Bush both are traveling in Southeast Asia this 
week. The itinerary of Bush’s six-day trip to six East Asian nations has security 
as its focus, according to pre-trip comments by National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice. (NEW YORK TIMES, 15 Oct 03) Mr. Bush is rewarding some 
of the U.S.’s most loyal East Asian allies in the war on terrorism. Though by no 
means ignoring economic issues, President Bush will focus on security issues 
when he attends the Asian Pacific Economic Community’s (APEC) summit in 
Malaysia on 20 and 21 October as well. 
 
 11 
President Putin, on the other hand, plans to seek the community’s backing in his 
bid to join the World Trade Organization. Mr. Putin, rather than thanking old 
allies, is looking to gain new ones. After courting Malaysia with military hardware 
sales and a presidential visit to Kuala Lumpur in August of this year (see 
previous NIS Observed), Putin was able to win an invitation not only to attend the 
10th Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) summit as a guest of Malaysia 
but also to address the conference participants. 
 
Attempting to induce the organization’s members to let Russia eventually join the 
OIC, Putin emphasized Russia’s large Muslim population of 20 million and the 
more than 7,000 Islamic mosques in the Russian Federation. Putin also tempted 
his audience with the idea of winning Russia, a permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council, as an ally of the Muslim World. The jury is still out on 
the success of Putin’s speech, although Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Seri 
Syed Hamid Albar acknowledged the possibility of the body cooperating with 
Russia in the future and noted that Putin’s presence would allow the organization 
to consider creating partnerships with non-Muslim countries. (THE STAR 
ONLINE (Malaysia), 17 Oct 03) 
 
Closer ties with the OIC would be a boon for Moscow, opening economic 
opportunities for Russian companies in the oil-rich Muslim world, easing tensions 
between Russia and Muslim countries over the war in Chechnya, and winning for 
the Kremlin vital geo-strategic allies in the race to counterbalance U.S. and 
Chinese influence in Asia. Moscow, apparently capitalizing on anti-U.S. 
sentiment in the Muslim world, is using its influence at the U.N. Security Council 
by offering to play big brother to the Islamic states, as long as Russian interests 
are served. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
MEDIA 
Just the flacks, ma’am 
After seeing how portions of the revised electoral law, particularly the aspects 
affecting media coverage, are being (ab)used this election season, several media 
outlets and some Duma deputies have asked the Constitutional Court to review 
the amended legislation. Their complaint: the new law is impinging on their ability 
to meet their professional responsibilities. Hearings began on 13 October (ITAR-
TASS, 13 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1013 via World News Connection); the court 
is expected to take at least two weeks to consider the much-opposed law. 
 
At issue is the vague wording of the revised legislation, which provides ample 
opportunities to constrain media coverage of candidates on the broadest of 
grounds. This is no longer simply an abstract problem. As Duma Deputy 
Aleksandr Kotyusov explained, the Tula electoral commission sent a warning to 
one newspaper for describing individual candidates, accurately, as an "actress," 
a "general," and the "son of murdered Deputy Sergei Yushenkov." 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 14 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1014 via World News 
Connection) The Bryansk Oblast’ electoral commission issued warnings to three 
local publications — for such heinous crimes as publishing poll results and 
interviewing a member of YABLOKO -- earning the disapproval of the not-so-
staunch defender of press liberty, Media Minister Mikhail Lesin. "Many of the 
media are already afraid of publishing items with any bite on the election theme. 
Yet the 30 day period in which the toughest campaigning rules will operate has 
not yet arrived," Lesin observed. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 3 Oct 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-1003 via World News Connection) The Moscow Election Commission 
has sent several warnings to Kommersant-Vlast and Tverskaya, 13 separate 
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warnings over articles about Yuri Luzhkov’s performance as the city’s mayor, 
while the commission of Kaliningrad Oblast’ has issued 18 warnings to local 
media. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 2 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1007 via World News 
Connection) 
 
Recent statements by supporters of the law indicate that the court, and public 
opinion, may be leaning toward mandating revision. The president’s 
representative to the court, Mikhail Mityukov, attempted to guide and one must 
suppose to limit, the court’s decision. "If the Constitutional Court explained the 
constitutional and legal meaning of the notions ‘informing the voters’ and ‘pre-
election propaganda,’ the presidential side would consider it a positive step 
ensuring free and democratic elections," he said. He acknowledged that the 
vague wording of the law can lead to abuses. (ITAR-TASS, 1642 GMT, 13 Oct 
03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1013 via World News Connection) 
 
Even one of the biggest proponents of the revised law, Central Election 
Commission (C.E.C.) Chairman Aleksandr Veshnyakov, has admitted that the 
new law may need to be tweaked. However, he claims that the opposition to the 
law has been organized for nefarious reasons. "It is beneficial for those who wish 
to gain money from illegal sources during the election," in particular from the 
abuse of office, he said. (ITAR-TASS, 1325 GMT, 30 Sep 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0930 via World News Connection) Subsequently he lashed critics of the law for 
using what he termed "subtle methods of heightening tension during the election 
campaign and putting pressure on the Constitutional Court." (ITAR-TASS, 1347 
GMT, 15 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1015 via World News Connection) Sadly, he 
seems unable to see the legitimacy of opposition to legislation he shepherded 
through parliament. 
 
Yet there is no doubt the media and the electorate are feeling the effects. As one 
paper explained: "Imagine watching a soccer match in which the commentator 
says nothing, the score never comes up on screen, and all the cameras show the 
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same angle. The fan gets no information on where the teams’ strengths and 
weak points lie, who the star players are... or what the teams’ chances are in the 
overall championship table... That is what is happening in our country right now 
with the elections." (IZVESTIYA, 15 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1015 via World 
News Connection) 
 
REGIONS 
The ruble stops where? 
President Vladimir Putin recently signed the Law on Local Self-Government, 
calling it "one of the most important components of the full-scale administrative 
reform." (ITAR-TASS, 6 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1006 via World News 
Connection) 
 
According to Vladimir Mokry, chairman of the State Duma Committee on 
Questions of Local Self-Government, the new law is meant to fill a vacuum with a 
clear demarcation of powers. "Each level of government, federal, regional, and 
local, should know the precise measure of its responsibility under the new law.… 
What is happening now? A vicious circle of irresponsibility. In the winter people 
are left without heat because the house manager says: ‘I do not have the money; 
the mayor did not allocate it.’ The mayor refers to how tight-fisted the governor is, 
and the governor, naturally, blames everything on the government of the Russian 
Federation. ... Now all the powers will be clearly prescribed: ‘Render onto [sic] 
Caesar that which is Caesar’s, and onto the mechanic that which is the 
mechanic’s.’" (TRUD, 1 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1003 via World News 
Connection) 
 
However, it is not the unwillingness to assume responsibility, but rather the 
inability to pay, that is at the heart of the problems cited. The fact of the matter is 
that, for a variety of reasons, there are insufficient funds in the local budgets to 
deal with these problems, and it is unlikely that this attempt at local government 
reform will improve the situation. Indeed, some recognition of the budgetary 
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problem has been acknowledged: The law will come into force on January 1, 
2006, in order to give governments time to adapt to the changes. As Putin 
explained, "We’ve envisaged a very long transitional period in order to prepare 
properly for implementing the law. (...) We need to submit amendments to many 
federal laws to parliament in good time in order to bring them into line with the 
revamped model of local self-government and federative relations." (MAYAK 
RADIO, 1400 GMT, 6 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1006 via World News 
Connection) 
 
And that brings up one itty bitty obstacle to the reform: Apparently, one of the 
items requiring amendment is the Russian Constitution. As one newspaper 
article recently pointed out, Article 72 of the Constitution gives the power over 
execution of budgets to RF subjects, that is, oblasts, krais and republics: "[T]he 
creation of a highly centralized model of controlling the budget reduces the level 
of independence and accountability of the regional organs of power, which does 
not correspond to the federative policy followed by the state." (ROSSIYSKAYA 
GAZETA, 9 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1009 via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Kris Beasly, USAF and Paul Lyons 
 
Russia keeping international space station manned 
In contrast to the exuberance of the Chinese space program, which launched its 
first taikonaut into orbit last week, and the glitz of the U.S. Space Program, with 
its high technology and large capacity space shuttle, the Russian space program 
has been characterized often as a low-tech, workman-like effort. Although the 
Russian space program was the first to orbit a man, a woman, and a couple in 
space and set many long-endurance records on the Mir space station, it has 
been severely underfunded since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and 
the government has had difficulty keeping the program alive. But, since the 
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February 2003 shuttle tragedy, it has been the continuity of the Russian space 
program in the form of the only-somewhat-modernized, but seemingly 
indestructible Soyuz space capsule that has enabled the international space 
station (ISS) to continue to operate. 
 
On 20 October 03, a Russian Soyuz TM-3, carrying the Expedition 8 crew of 
astronaut Michael Foale of the United States and Russian cosmonaut Aleksandr 
Kaleri, successfully docked with the ISS. (WWW.CNN.COM, 17 Oct 03 & 20 Oct 
03) Foale will be the new I.S.S. commander with Kaleri as his Flight Engineer; 
they expect to stay up for about 200 days (six months by themselves plus 10 
days of overlap on each end with the other crews). Also aboard the Soyuz was 
European Space Agency (ESA) astronaut Pedro Duque of Spain, who will stay 
during the 10-day transition period and then return with the Expedition 7 crew on 
their Soyuz that has been docked to the ISS since their arrival in April of this 
year. (RIA NOVOSTI, 2 Oct 03 via gazeta.ru/english) 
 
This is the second crew of the ISS that has been sent up by the Russians since 
the Columbia accident grounded the Space Shuttle. Without the Russian 
program stepping up to the task, the ISS might have gone unmanned, with 
potentially dangerous results. Space stations have been left unmanned before 
(e.g. Mir), but getting individuals back on board is hazardous and potentially fatal. 
Former astronaut Charlie Precourt, now NASA’s deputy ISS program manager, 
told Russian space officials, "I want to convey our thanks for your support during 
this period when the shuttle cannot fly." WWW.CNN.COM, 17 Oct 03) 
 
Although NASA is progressing toward the resumption of the shuttle flights, at 
least one more flight, that of the Expedition 9 crew of Russian cosmonaut Valeri 
Tokarev, and American astronaut William McArthur (with Dutch ESA astronaut 
Andre Kuipers along for the 10 day transition program) will have to be launched 
from the Russian-manned space center at Baikonur, Kazakhstan. 
(WWW.EN.RIAN.RU (RIA NOVOSTI), 18 Oct 03). If NASA’s current plan to 
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resume shuttle flights next Fall can’t be met, then reliance on the Russian 
program is likely to continue as well. 
 
Russia had agreed previously to send up fresh Soyuz crafts every six months as 
ISS rescue vessels, and to provide several ISS resupply missions a year; 
however, the strain of launching more Soyuz crafts than expected (since the 
shuttle accident) apparently has posed a challenge for Russian officials. In fact, 
Nikolai Zelenshchikov, deputy director of RKK Energiya, which builds the Soyuz, 
said on 17 October 03 that a lack of funding from the Federal government has 
delayed launch of a resupply vessel until early 2004. Fortunately, the ISS is 
provisioned well enough for Zelenshchikov to have insisted that the crew would 
not go without vital supplies. NASA spokesman Rob Navias declared likewise, 
"They won't be up there missing any creature comforts." (WWW.CNN.COM, 17 
Oct 03) 
 
In order to alleviate the burden imposed by the shuttle failure and to help expand 
the ISS capabilities, one of the key tasks of the Expedition 8 crew is the 
installation of docking equipment on the Russian ISS Zvezda module. The 
Russian built "Kursk" automated docking system will enable the new ESA-
provided ATV cargo supply vessels to dock with the ISS. According to Russian 
Mission Control Center spokesman Valeri Lyndin, the first ESA vessel should 
arrive, "in the second half of 2004." (WWW.EN.RIAN.RU, 18 Oct 03) 
 
Each country with a manned space program has developed different levels of 
connection between its programs and its respective militaries. The Chinese 
program is entirely military, the American and European programs are almost 
entirely civil and the Russian program is somewhere in the middle. In the U.S. 
and Europe, about half of the astronauts are detailed over from the military, 
whereas all the Chinese taikonauts are active duty fighter pilots and most of the 
Russian cosmonauts are active duty officers. In the American, European and 
Russian programs, the astronauts and cosmonauts usually stay in the program 
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and seldom go back to military duty, a trend which can lead to interesting 
situations. For example, the current I.S.S. Expedition 7 commander, Yuri 
Malenchenko, had a tailcoat and wedding ring quietly slipped on a cargo ship 
that arrived at the ISS this June. He planned an August wedding, via 
videoconference, with Ekaterina Dmitriev, an American citizen who migrated from 
Russia when she was three years old. Malenchenko however is not a civilian; 
he’s a Russian Air Force Colonel, and under Russian Soviet law, he has access 
to state secrets and must have permission from his commander to get married. 
The tension that exists between spacefarers and regular military officials on all 
continents is plainly evident in the words of the Russian Air Force Chief, Colonel-
General Vladimir Mikhailov, when he was told of the plan: "A cosmonaut must not 
behave like a movie star!" (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA via www.cnn.com, 23 
Jul 03) Despite talk of a potential five or ten year waiting period, Russian officials 
recovered their senses in time and allowed the happy couple to wed. 
 
Who would ever have imagined it? 
To enable appropriate debates over government spending priorities, most 
democracies are accustomed to explaining, in great detail, all but a sliver of their 
military budgets to the press, their publics, and especially to their legislatures. 
But military budget details have always been a state secret in Russia (as in the 
USSR before that), even from the legislature. In fact, western intelligence 
agencies have worked diligently, perhaps at the price of lives in a few instances, 
to determine what Russia’s military budget was, both to track weapon system 
acquisition and also to gauge its impact on the overall economy. (Robert M. 
Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insiders Story of Five Presidents and 
how They Won the Cold War, Simon and Schuster, NY, 1996). 
 
Thus, eyebrows were raised when Chief of the General Staff General Anatoli 
Kvashnin recently asked Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov to authorize the 
unveiling of portions of select Russian Defense budget details to NATO, given 
that NATO countries share defense budget data among themselves. To quote 
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Kvashnin’s request, "Bearing in mind Russia's interest in development of 
cooperation with NATO, I hereby request your instructions to the federal 
executive power structures to contemplate the possibility and procedures of 
sending statistical data on national arms expenditures to the Russia-NATO 
Council." (MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS, 22 Sep 03 via What the Papers Say 
- Defense and Security, 25 Sep 03) What "statistical data" are involved is 
unkown; R&D data have been classified always. 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Dept of Defense or the United 
States government. 
 
NAVY 
New military doctrine unveiled 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov recently unveiled Russia's new military defense 
doctrine, titled the "Open Doctrine of Military Modernization." This white paper, 
which was presented to an expanded session of the Russian military and political 
leadership, describes a transformation of Russia's military into a force more 
poised to combat the challenges of the 21st century. President Putin has 
emphasized a top-down approach to the transformation of Russia's military by his 
recent budget initiatives and by his public statements. He put the emphasis on 
achieving an increasingly capable force, stating, "While seeking broad 
cooperation with foreign states and strengthening the systems of international 
law, we must not devote less attention to and, even more so, abandon the 
development of our defense potential. In the final analysis, this potential is the 
guarantee of Russia's sovereignty and security." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 04 
Oct 03; FBIS-NES-2003-1006 via World News Connection) Most notably, 
President Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov have been extolling several 
facets of Russia's new military doctrine to the press during the promotional 
rhetoric - most critically, issues of pre-emptive strikes and the use of Russian 
military force within neighboring in support of Russian interests, broadly defined. 
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Military action on the territory of other CIS states 
Although a detailed analysis awaits the publication of the text of the doctrine, 
Radio Liberty recently noted (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 7, 10 Oct 03) that Putin, 
after the completion of the Russo-German summit, asserted Moscow's right to 
"carry out pre-emptive military strikes abroad if it deems it necessary to do so." 
With far-reaching CIS implications, he further claimed that Russia would not 
relinquish control over the pipeline infrastructure across the territories of the FSU. 
Russia, as successor state to the Soviet Union, which built the gas pipeline 
system, is the only state capable of keeping the whole system working. (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, vol. 7, 10 Oct 03). Leaving nothing to chance, Defense Minister 
Sergei Ivanov added to Putin's interpretation of the doctrine on pre-emptive 
military force. "The CIS is a very crucial sphere for our security. Ten million of our 
compatriots live there and we are supplying energy to them at prices below 
international levels. We are not going to renounce the right to use military power 
there in situations where all other means have been exhausted." (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, vol. 7, 10 Oct 03) The newly-formed air base in Krygyzstan may 
provide one of the means of implementing such a policy. 
 
With the transition from conscript to contract service ongoing, the new military 
defense doctrine laid out by Ivanov calls for an increase in the number of 
permanent readiness troops as "a core priority of modernization." (INTERFAX, 
02 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1003 via World News Connection). Like its U.S. 
counterpart, Ivanov's doctrine states that through its expanded troop base, 
"Russia must be able successfully to perform its missions in two armed conflicts 
of any type and conduct peacekeeping operations without carrying out any type 
of mobilization." (INTERFAX, 02 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1003 via World News 
Connection). Russia may get an opportunity for a major "peacekeeping 
operation" should the U.N. Security Council opt for an increased international 
presence in the post-conflict peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. 
President Putin clearly is keeping his cards close to the vest until a formal U.N. 
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resolution on an international peacekeeping force is adopted. In an interview with 
the New York Times, he stated, "concerning a possibility of sending a Russian 
military contingent to Iraq, we are not even discussing it prior to the adoption of 
the U.N. resolution." (ITAR-TASS, 06 Oct 03; FBIS-NES-2003-1006 via World 
News Connection). 
 
As for the controversial use of pre-emptive force in future conflicts, Defense 
Minister Ivanov stated that "Russia cannot absolutely rule out pre-emptive use of 
force if it is dictated by its interests or commitments to its allies." He added that 
"use of force is a measure of last resort which is only to be used when all other 
means are exhausted." (ITAR-TASS, 02 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1003 via World 
News Connection) Ivanov's comments on the pre-emptive use of force were met 
with calls for clarity from NATO. President Putin, in an interview with Al-Jazeera 
network, attempted to clarify Ivanov's comments by stating that "What he had in 
mind, and this is my view as well, is this: We are against such a policy, but if 
other nations continue to make a priority (of pre-emptive strikes) in their foreign 
policy, then Russia reserves the right to act in the same way." (AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, 17 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis). 
 
Transformation and modernization 
With a current army force structure of nearly 1.6 million soldiers (down from 
nearly 2.75 million in the early 90's), Russia's military is being forced to transform 
into a smaller, more agile and more capable force, similar to the U.S. model. 
(The armed forces at the disposal of other "power ministries" constitute a 
separate category.) Intrinsic in that transformation will be not only a "re-tooling" of 
military thought and policy, but investments in modern technologies and 
architectures to lead and orchestrate the force. Present at the highly-publicized 
unveiling of the doctrine at the Defense Ministry was President Vladimir Putin 
who echoed the priorities of transformation and modernization within Russia's 
military. Putin stressed the armed forces need "quickly and intelligently to master 
new command and communication systems" (KREMLIN.RU, 03 Oct 03; FBIS-
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SOV-2003-1003 via World News Connection) in meeting the dynamic challenges 
of the global landscape. 
 
Fourth generation submarine on the horizon 
Admiralty Wharves, a Russian defense contractor, is nearing completion of 
Russia's fourth generation diesel submarine. The first of the class, the Saint 
Petersburg, has been in production since 1997 and is scheduled to commence 
testing and trials in Spring 2004. 
 
The submarine is said to be similar in design to the capable German 212A 
submarines. The Saint Petersburg "differs from third-generation submarines in 
that it has one hull instead of two, a new level of systems automation and new 
weapons. Moreover, it can sail for up to 40 days, which allows it to sail in the 
oceans." (RUSSIA JOURNAL, 06 Oct 03) Key design improvements within the 
Saint Petersburg include a diminished acoustic signature, a fully integrated multi-
array sonar suite, reduced manning, significantly improved batteries, and an 
enhanced combat-control system. The single hull design offers less reserve 
buoyancy and battle damage survivability potential than Russia's double-hull 
designs, but allows for greater speed and maneuverability, characteristics vital to 
operating in the world's littorals. 
 
In line with Russia's high-profile Indian Ocean and Far East/Pacific operations 
this year, the fourth generation submarine will bring to the forefront a viable 
diesel submarine capable of out-of-area operations and supporting Russia's blue-
water renaissance. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
BELARUS 
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New media law considered 
At a press conference on 2 October 2003, President Lukashenka revealed his 
plans for a new media law: "We should fill in the gaps in the existing law. The law 
should be modern, it should embrace the whole media sphere…It is aimed at 
reaching quickly and efficiently to any offences in this area. This law should 
guarantee freedom of speech, but at the same time it should not turn into 
freedom of slander and provide biased coverage and facts." (BBC 
MONITORING, 2 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
For the first time, the internet will be considered a mass media source. The 
Ministry of Information and the Prosecutor-General's office stated that the court 
would have the power to intervene in the distribution of internet-based 
publications and sue the journalists for spreading false information. (NOVAYA 
GAZETA, 9 Oct 03) In Belarus, such a development is feasible due to the 
presence of an internet monopoly: there is only one internet provider, 
Beltelekom. All alternative providers are obliged to send and receive information 
only through its server. An ominous precedent of censoring internet publications 
already exists in Belarus. In 2001, when the presidential elections were taking 
place, it was impossible to access such internet sites as Radio Liberty, Hartiya-
97, Our Freedom or dozens of other online publications. (NOVAYA GAZETA, 9 
Oct 03) 
 
Just two prior warnings are required to shut down newspapers and other media 
channels. A precedent for a transgression that triggered the new law was set by 
the Belarussian Supreme Court on 9 October, when it ordered the public 
association Women's Response (not a mass-media source, but a source of 
information) disbanded for breaching the law, namely: giving the wrong address 
during the registration in 2000 and using a stamp which was not in conformity 
with regulations. (MINSK BELAPAN, 09 Oct 03; FBIS-2003-1009 via World News 
Connection) 
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Mikhail Pastukhov of the Belarussian Association of Journalists pointed out that 
the new law would give authorities even more power over the media and would 
complicate media registration procedures. He also noted that the law required all 
media outlets to register within one year. Percy Bratt of the Swedish Helsinki 
Committee of Human Rights likewise has concerns about the clause, which 
prohibits the media from disseminating information on behalf of unregistered 
organizations, thus substantially restricting their freedom of expression. (MINSK 
BELAPAN, 07 Oct 03; FBIS-2003-1007 via World News Connection) 
 
Unsurprisingly, the new media law was written without public input. Valeri 
Levkov, a journalist for Belorusskaya delovaya gazeta, said that the draft media 
law "was certainly not discussed with the journalists of Belarus. Maybe it was 
discussed with Pavel Jakubovich, the editor in chief of Sovetskaya Belarussiya, 
which is an official newspaper of the presidential administration." (RFE/RL, 10 
Oct 03) Levkov also pointed out that the draft media law was supposed to be 
sent to European institutions for evaluation. 
 
The new media law is yet another in a long line of attempts to restrict freedom of 
speech in Belarus. In the last two years, approximately twenty independent 
political newspapers have folded in Belarus, either due to direct interference by 
the authorities or to the discriminatory economic measures of the state. 
(WWW.INDEXONLINE.ORG, 22 Sep 03) The Belarussian Association of 
Journalists (BAJ) has been awarded the 2003 Golden Pen of Freedom award for 
its courageous resistance to the repression of the media by President 
Lukashenka. "The BAJ is fighting bravely against what is probably the most 
repressive regime in Europe," said the Paris-based World Association of 
Newspapers, when presenting the award. (WWW.INDEXONLINE.ORG, 27 Oct 
02) 
 
Public opinion polls in Belarus 
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According to a public poll conducted by the Independent Institute for 
Socioeconomic and Political Research (IISPR) in Belarus, 48.8% of Belarussians 
are dissatisfied with government policy. Over 1,500 people participated in the 
Institute's poll, which also indicated that 70% of Belarussians were planning to 
vote in the 2004 parliamentary elections, 42.4% did not believe that the election 
would be free, while 38.5% expressed the opposite opinion. The Belarussian 
Women's Party was the most popular among respondents (7.5%), followed by 
the Party of Communists of Belarus (5.2%). (MINSK BELAPAN, 13 Oct 03; FBIS-
2003-1013 via World News Connection) 
 
UKRAINE 
Ukraine-E.U. Yalta Summit 
The most recent summit between the 15 member European Union and Ukraine 
took place on 7 October 2003 in Yalta. At the end of the summit the President of 
the European Commission, Romano Prodi, along with the former Italian Prime 
Minister and current E.U. President Silvio Berlusconi both expressed hope that 
Ukraine could join the E.U. in the future. No date for Ukraine's accession to the 
E.U. was set at the summit, and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma stated that 
the country would not be ready to begin accession negotiations until 2011. 
 
The members of the E.U. delegation made a statement following the E.U.-
Ukraine summit, in which they recognized Ukraine's economic achievements and 
the stability of the national currency. The issue of compensation to Ukraine as a 
result of the economic impact of E.U. enlargement was raised at the summit as 
well. Ukraine is seeking an estimated $580 million for the loss of trade. 
(AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, 14 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) In 2004, Ukrainian trade 
with the new E.U. members is predicted to drop by 10%, thus, substantially 
complicating the achievement of its market economy status, which is one of the 
Copenhagen criteria for joining the Union. 
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Recent visa restrictions on Ukrainian citizens trying to enter new E.U. member 
states erects both a physical and an emotional barrier between the E.U. and 
Ukraine, limiting Ukrainian citizens' opportunities to visit their relatives in the new 
E.U. member states. 
 
Does Ukraine have a real chance to join the E.U. some day? Maybe, but the 
prospects seem bleak. Before even proceeding to the discussion of Ukraine's 
ability to survive economically in the E.U., Ukraine has to improve its human 
rights record, assure freedom of speech to its citizens (difficult with the high-
profile murder of a journalist still unresolved) and fix its chronically-slanted 
elections. The recent signing of the Single Economic Space Agreement with 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan also has not helped to give the E.U. assurance 
that Ukraine is seriously intending to join the Union. But even if Ukraine 
miraculously does fulfill all the conditions, is it a safe assumption that a 27 
member E.U. (the current membership target) will still be prepared to accept it? 
 
MOLDOVA 
Seeing assistance from the Council of Europe 
Moldova has applied to the Council of Europe for assistance in resolving disputes 
between Moldova and Romania. This move came as a result of Romania's 
refusal to sign a treaty confirming Moldova's present borders. (DEUTSCHE 
PRESSE-AGENTUR, 13 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) The exact words of the 
Moldovan Foreign Ministry were: "these problems and absence of progress in 
their resolution pose a threat for the existence of the Moldovan state, destabilize 
the situation in the country, considerably retard the process of final settlement of 
the Dniester conflict and affect negatively the process of European integration of 
the republic." (ITAR-TASS, 13 Oct 03; FBIS-2003-1013 via World News 
Connection) 
 
Ghiorghi Prisacaru, the head of the Romanian Parliamentary delegation, 
criticized Moldova's statement, saying that Moldova's position was regrettable 
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because it constituted an attempt to transform a bilateral issue into a multilateral 
one. Prisacaru noted also that Romania's position on the issue was clear — 
Romania recognizes Moldova's independence and sovereignty. 
 
Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin stated in a television interview on Sunday 
that: "The Romanian thesis of two Romanian states is unacceptable. We have 
our own country. We are ready for cooperation, but without interference in our 
internal affairs." (DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, 13 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
In 1940, as a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, Romania lost Bessarabia, 
Northern Bukovona and Hertza to the USSR. When the pact was signed, the 
territories between Prut and Dniestr belonged to Romania. Since the recognition 
of the Republic of Moldova as an independent state a lot has been said in 
Romania about the necessity of eliminating the consequences of the Ribbentrop-
Molotov Pact. In June 1991, Romania's Parliament adopted a declaration in 
which the pact was declared null and void. (STUDINT.ONG.RO, 30 Oct 94) 
Romania, which was the first state to recognize the Republic of Moldova upon 
the proclamation of its independence, has never signed an agreement with 
Moldova defining the two countries' frontiers. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
The October 15 Azerbaijani presidential election, which, as expected, brought 
Ilham Aliev to power, signified a continuation of former President Heidar Aliev’s 
foreign and economic policies. However, significant opposition unrest both to the 
election process and the choice of Aliev, indicates that the authoritarian regime 
created and repressively enforced by Heidar Aliev is no longer viable in the 
increasingly open Azeri political scene. 
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Opposition unrest began on the evening of October 15, with accusations by the 
Musavat Party of massive ballot fraud in favor of Ilham Aliev. (AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, 16 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Protests continued into the 
following day and culminated in two open clashes between supporters of Isa 
Gambar, of the Musavat party, and police in Baku. The first scuffle arose with 
riots by several thousand Gambar supporters (WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, 16 Oct 
03 via ISI Emerging Databases) in which, according to statements by the ruling 
Yeni Azerbaijan party, two persons were killed. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 16 Oct 
03 via Lexis-Nexis). The second, by most accounts, resulted from police 
aggression and left over 50 civilians badly injured. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 
17 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging Databases) 
 
In the aftermath of the elections and resulting violence, there has been a marked 
polarity in statements by various government officials and by observers as to 
quality of government demonstrated by the election process and violence. 
According to Giovanni Kessler, head of delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly, and Human Rights Watch 
(WWW.HRW.ORG/backgrounder/eca/azerbaijan/index.htm) the election was 
undemocratic and the violence resulted from the lack of governmental control 
over the police. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 16 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis; Financial 
Times, 17 Oct 03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis) On the other hand, the 
Turkish, Russian and Iranian governments openly congratulated Ilham Aliev on 
his victory. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 17 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis; ITAR TASS, 16 Oct 
03; What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging Databases; FINANCIAL TIMES, 18 
Oct 03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis). The U.S. government has been silent 
so far, thus attempting to distance itself from the undemocratic means used to 
solidify Ilham Aliev’s ascendancy to power while at least tacitly acknowledging 
Aliev’s presidency. 
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The reactions of the Turkish, Iranian, Russian and U.S. governments are not 
particularly surprising given their stakes in the international and multi-national 
corporate competition for Azerbaijan’s vast natural gas and oil reserves. At 
present, Azerbaijan's has 1.2 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, as well as vast 
potential reserves in undeveloped offshore Caspian fields. 
(GEO.YA.COM/travelimages/az-oil.html) The major oil companies invested in 
these oil fields and the various export pipelines include British Petroleum, 
Chevron Texaco, ConocoPhilips and the EU, through the TRACECA program to 
rehabilitate and upgrade the Caspian seaport near Baku. The proven natural gas 
reserves stand roughly at 4.4 trillion cubic feet, in which several multi-national 
corporations, including Exxon Mobil, are also invested. (Ibid.) 
 
The Iranian government is still anxious to renew talks over a proposal to 
transport oil from Baku via a proposed 300km pipeline to Tabriz in northwest 
Iran, where it would also connect with the existing Iranian pipeline network and 
refineries. (Ibid) On the other end of the spectrum, Washington has noted the 
tense relations between Baku and Teheran over disputed oil fields in the Caspian 
and might be inclined to support Azerbaijan militarily as a counterpoise for Iran. 
Additionally, the U.S. is keen to seal the alliance of Azerbaijan with Georgia and 
Turkey with the help of the $2.9-billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and a 
parallel gas pipeline to the northern Turkish city of Erzurum. (BBC Monitoring, 15 
Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
The fruition of these investments depends on Ilham Aliev’s ability to maintain 
control over the country. Indeed, doubts persist whether President Aliev can 
count on the unanimous support of the ruling elite. A number of Azeri 
government officials depend on patronage from the Aliev regime for their 
privileged positions (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 13 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging 
Databases), constituting the main reason for Ilham Aliev’s current support within 
the state structure and among the Yeni Azerbaijan party. However, it is unclear 
whether Ilham possesses the authority, or the support within the government 
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apparatus, to maintain his father’s balancing act of allowing limited political 
freedom while committing human rights abuses which keep Azerbaijan on the 
hook of international criticism. Therefore, until Ilham Aliev defines a political 
course (one which, most believe, will eschew balance in favor of a stark choice 
between authoritarianism or democratization) the loyalty of the ruling class can 
be purchased by the highest bidder. 
 
GEORGIA 
The new Russian military doctrine which specifically endorses Russian 
preventative military strikes constitutes a clear statement of warning for any CIS 
country attempting to free itself of economic and political dependence from 
Russia, e.g. Georgia. Indeed, although the doctrine originated, supposedly, as a 
result of the perceived need for action, inter alia, against "terrorist factions" 
(ITAR-TASS, 12 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1012 via World News Connection), in 
reality this document contains a barely veiled Russian message to Georgia that, 
one way or another, Moscow plans to regain the power it lost after the fall of the 
USSR. Indeed, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov’s statement concerning the 
permissibility of Russian resort to force was countered by Georgian President 
Shevardnadze’s censure of Russia’s doctrine and his statement that preventive 
strikes were incompatible with international law. (GEORGIAN TV, Oct 10 03 
FBIS-SOV-2003-1010 via World News Connection) 
 
On the other hand, Georgia has shown signs of weakening lately. Under U.N. 
auspices, a Georgian-Abkhaz meeting opened on 8 October with the 
participation of the Abkhaz "Foreign Minister" Sergei Shamba and the Georgian 
Minister for Special Assignments, Malkhaz Kakbadze, with the objective of 
reducing tensions between Georgia and Abkhazia. (ITAR-TASS, 8 Oct 03; BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis) The fact that a member of the Georgian government 
agreed to meet a high Abkhaz official may be viewed as a tacit 
acknowledgement of Abkhazian independence. In addition, the Georgian 
government and Abkhaz officials have agreed on the creation of a joint venture to 
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fight crime (KAVKASIA-PRESS, 9 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1009 via World News 
Connection) creating another indicator that Georgian-recognized Abkhazian 
independence may become a reality. 
 
At the same time, Russian and Georgian economic ties have deepened with the 
hosting of a two day economic forum in Tbilisi, (SARKE-PRESS DIGEST, 19 Oct 
03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis) which is slated to discuss joint Russian-
Georgian projects worth an estimated $10 billion in areas such as internal 
development of roads, links, and railways in Georgia. (ITAR-TASS , 16 Oct 03 
FBIS-SOV-2003-1016 via World News Connection) In response to these talks 
and the obvious development of Georgian-Russian ties, Georgian President 
Shevardnadze stated that "Taking shelter with Russia is better than being in the 
cold and dark"— a clear indication of Shevardnadze’s dependence on Russian 
sources of energy. (MTAVARI GAZETI, 19 Oct 03 FBIS-SOV-2003-1019 via 
World News Connection; See also recent editions of NIS Observed) 
 
Indeed, neither the West nor its institutions have given him much of an 
alternative with the indefinite postponement of scheduled IMF talks, which were 
to discuss a three-year strategy to aid Georgia, including the rescheduling of its 
debts to Paris Club members, (KAVKASIA PRESS, 11 Oct 03 FBIS-SOV-2003-
1012 via World News Connection) while continued Western pressure over the 
upcoming Georgian parliamentary elections has distracted President 
Shevardnadze. A stream of Western dignitaries has recently traipsed through 
Georgia, including Senator John McCain, General John Shalikashvili, Strobe 
Talbott, and James Baker, as well as representatives of the Council of Europe, 
and of the National Democratic Institute for Foreign Affairs (NDI) 
(WWW.EURASIANNET.ORG/departments/insight/articles/pp101903.shtml). 
These visitors have been quick to criticize, as in May, when the Council of 
Europe warned Georgia that it might be put on its black list due to Tbilisi’s 
inability to curb corruption. In an increasingly tense environment, Georgia fears 
that the U.S. may criticize the parliamentary elections and further reduce foreign 
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aid. However, an additional cut in foreign assistance, juxtaposed with European 
and American criticism of Georgia's government would push the country further 
into the Russian sphere, a development that President Shevardnadze, President 
Bush, nor the E.U. want to encourage. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Trade and the persistent issue of borders 
It can be argued that the existing border disputes of Central Asia have roots in 
the incongruity between the historical khanate boundaries and the boundaries 
created by the 1920s Soviet delimitation project. Controversy over the post-
independence borders periodically presents itself as a challenge for diplomacy 
and many of the regional trade negotiations are negotiations in fact concerning 
state sovereignty and external influence. As the European Union, Russia, and 
the United States all vie for economic and security-related influence, the national 
borders of Central Asia become increasingly reified and the awkwardness of the 
ethno-linguistic boundaries of Soviet construction requires negotiation within an 
internationally accepted state system. 
 
Much of the renewed international interest in Central Asia relates to the "fight 
against terrorism." To this end, the U.S. and allied forces have established 
military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and Russian troops have increased 
their presence in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. October 23 is the date scheduled for 
the opening ceremony of the Russian airbase in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, which 
contractually will be operable for 15 years with the possibility of extending the 
agreement for five year terms and will host over 500 personnel and 20 aircraft, 
including the Su-25, Su-27 low-flying attack planes, and An-26 planes as well as 
Mi-8 helicopters. Four MiG-29 fighters arrived at the base on 15 October, where 
they joined two Su-25s and four L-39s already present. (ITAR-TASS, 0718 GMT, 
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14 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1014; 0736 GMT, 15 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1015 
via World News Connection) 
 
According to Maxim Peshkov, Russian Ambassador to Tajikistan, Russia is in the 
process of negotiating an agreement with Tajikistan transforming the Russian 
201st motorized infantry division "into a Russian military base" that would have 
responsibilities under the Collective Security Treaty Organization and continued 
responsibility for guarding the Tajik-Afghan border. (ITAR-TASS, 1531 GMT, 10 
Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1010; 1339 GMT, 14 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1014 via 
World News Connection) The proposed transformation of the Russian 201st 
comes after the September announcement by Nuralisho Nazarov, a senior Tajik 
official, that Tajikistan no longer required the presence of Russian border troops. 
 
Russian troops along the Tajik-Afghan border routinely report the exchange of 
artillery fire and the confiscation of drugs being smuggled across the border, 
including a recent cache of 929 kg of opium, 111 kg of heroin and 19 kg of 
marijuana. (ITAR-TASS, 0816 GMT, 8 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1008; 0648 
GMT, 6 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1006; FBIS-SOV-2003-1006 via World News 
Connection) Tajik border troops have a less impressive reputation of stopping 
drug traffickers and Nazarov’s comment was most likely a statement made to 
express Tajik dissatisfaction with Russia’s recent crackdown on Tajik migrant 
labor and Tajikistan’s exclusion from the core of the CIS Unified Economic Space 
established at the September summit in Yalta.(WWW.EURASIANET.ORG, 22 
Sep 03) 
 
Relations between Russia and Tajikistan have been more strained since the U.S. 
dramatically increased its presence in Tajikistan, after 11 September 2001. And 
the connection between Nazarov’s comment and economics may seem a stretch 
until one considers both the stabilizing presence of Russian troops in Tajikistan 
and the impact of Russia’s restriction of migrant workers has on the Tajik 
economy. Remittances from Tajiks working abroad totaled close to $250 million 
 34 
in 2002, an amount that parallels the country’s annual budget; most of those 
workers go to Russia. According to a commentary in the Tajik newspaper Asia-
Plus: "Putin has given the ‘green light’ to about half a million Kyrgyz labor 
migrants in exchange for a military base [Kant] and the deployment of 500 
servicemen in Kyrgyzstan." (WWW.EURASIANET.ORG, 7 Oct 03) 
 
By implying a relationship between preferential treatment for Kyrgyz migrant 
laborers over Tajiks wishing to work in Russia, and security via the military base, 
a legitimate observation is made about the complexity of relations within the 
region. The Kazakh newspaper Ekspress-K recently carried an article entitled 
"Good protection for big oil," wherein it reported the U.S. Department of Defense 
would financially support the construction of a military base in Atyrau, 
Kazakhstan. (EKSPRESS-K, 0001 GMT, 7 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1007 via 
World News Connection) As this would be the first such base in the Caspian 
region, the Kazakh press was making a connection between U.S. interests in the 
oil rich region and military support aimed at protecting American investments 
abroad. 
 
As Russia and the U.S. vie for influence through support of various defense 
initiatives, interdependent trade relations are seen as an equally important aspect 
of regional security. The European Union will continue the implementation of its 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Kyrgyzstan, a project aimed 
at improving cultural, economic, legal, political, scientific, and social cooperation. 
The E.U. plans to develop more PCA projects with both Kazakhstan and 
Tajikistan. (TIMES OF CENTRAL ASIA, 26 Sep 03 via www.times.kg) Tajikistan 
is actively taking steps to expand trade with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, in hopes 
of gaining greater stability and influence along borders. (ITAR-TASS, 0821 GMT, 
11 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1011 via World News Connection) Russian President 
Vladimir Putin has expressed interest in deepening ties with Uzbekistan along 
areas of mutual interest and Uzbek Deputy Prime Minister and Economics 
Minister, Rustam Azimov, described Russia as Uzbekistan’s "main trade 
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partner." (ITAR-TASS, 1132 GMT, 13 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1013; 1326 GMT, 
10 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1010 via World News Connection) 
 
The recent development of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia 
(TRACECA) project, the shortest ground route for transporting goods from 
Europe to Asia, is aimed at creating stability by fostering a mutually beneficial 
route for trade and tourism. This "New Silk Road," as it is unofficially called, is 
being developed out of an E.U. initiative aimed at bringing Europe and Central 
Asia closer together. (TIMES OF CENTRAL ASIA, 10 Oct 03 via www.times.kg) 
But there are hurdles ahead for developing relations with Central Asia. 
 
It has been only since 15 October that Uzbekistan’s national currency (the Uzbek 
Sum) has been convertible on the world monetary market without restrictions. 
(ITAR-TASS, 2028 GMT, 15 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1015 via World News 
Connection) While this makes it the last of the former Soviet countries to remove 
currency restrictions and thereby remove one obstacle to foreign investment, a 
recent survey of 133 countries by the London-based NGO Transparency 
International placed Tajikistan as 124th on its Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI), ranking it among the most corrupt countries in the world. On the whole, 
Central Asia ranked very high regarding corruption, with Kyrgyzstan ranking 
118th on the CPI whereas Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were 100th on the list. 
Turkmenistan was not included in the index, but certainly it would not have fared 
well and would fit in the rankings of its Central Asian neighbors. (TIMES OF 
CENTRAL ASIA, 16 Oct 03 via www.times.kg) 
 
Given the levels of corruption and the continued disagreement over delineated 
borders (KABAR, 0927 GMT, 7 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1007 via World News 
Connection), it bodes well for the countries of Central Asia that issues of defense 
and influence can be combined with trade. 
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